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Evidence of Environmental Justice: A Critical Perspective on the Practice of EJ Research 
and Lessons for Policy Design 
1.  The EJ literature 
In environmental policy, the disconnect between the pursuit of individual interests and 
the pursuit of collective goals is paramount.  In this sense, the acrimony surrounding many 
environmental policy debates is both understandable and inevitable.  Environmental justice (EJ) 
is a major theme in environmental and social policy.  A debate about the empirical evidence and 
appropriate policies continues among academics.  After scaling this mountain of literature, what 
are some important lessons to be learned for making EJ policy?  From this vantage, this paper 
critiques the field of EJ research.  It also offers some suggestions for more closely linking the EJ 
research agenda to policy.  The conclusion returns to the broad assessment of EJ policy and 
suggests some future directions for designing policy and framing the discourse. 
The background of environmental justice – the EJ movement, research, and related 
polices – has been rehearsed elsewhere.  For useful histories, see Ringquist (2006), Agyeman 
and Evans (2004), Bowen and Wells (2002), Bowen (2000), Liu (2000).  The emphasis here is 
on the nature of the debate and discussion among academics.  In particular, this article limits its 
attention to the part of the literature concerned with identifying evidence of environmental 
inequities.   
The universal support for the notion of “justice” belies the contentious nature of defining 
and pursuing it.  The search for empirical evidence of environmental injustice (or inequity) has 
attracted the attention of a wide range of scholars, including those in the fields of sociology, 
public and environmental health, law, geography, political science, economics, planning, and 
environmental studies.  From such disparate fields, using disparate methods, what constitutes 
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evidence of injustice varies widely in the literature.  Likewise, the quality of research has ranged 
widely in the literature (see, e.g., the discussions in Ringquist 2005, Bowen 2000). 
The scholarly discourse has addressed several important issues in empirical research.  
More detailed critiques can be found at Bowen (2000), Mitchell and Walker (2007), and 
Schweitzer and Stephenson (2007).  First and foremost, there are methodological concerns.  Liu 
(2000) categorizes these issues as concerning measurement of impacts, measurement or 
populations, defining units of analysis, statistical analysis, and modeling spatial and urban 
systems.  Some measures of injustice have been contested (see, e.g., Maantay 2002, Mennis 
2002, Jerrett et al. 2001) as inappropriate, especially the proxies used for actual or potential 
environmental risks or impacts.   
There is also debate over the generalizability of research findings.  This is especially true 
for those results derived from case studies or from studies using methods where the sample is 
selected based on the dependent variable (Ringquist 2006, Ringquist 2005, Bowen and Wells 
2002, Bowen 2000).  At the heart of much of the methodological debate rests the researcher’s 
choice (often dictated by data availability) of units of analysis.  Researchers’ choices of spatial 
scale – both extent and resolution – may not be neutral to the results (see Section 2, below).  The 
difficulties posed for drawing generalizable conclusions when the scale of the observations 
differs from the scale of analysis or the scale of the phenomenon of interest has long been known 
as a problem of ecological inference.  To parallel the complexities of spatial scale, temporal 
dimensions of EJ research pose particularly thorny problems.  Cross-sectional studies, which 
note that environmental hazards are disproportionately collocated with certain groups, fail to 
identify the sequence of events that led to such an equilibrium.  Adjudging a particular situation 
as just or unjust, according to these critics, implies going beyond questions of mere distributional 
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equity.  Some explanation of how the inequitable circumstances came about seems necessary 
(Helfand and Peyton 1999, Baden and Coursey 2002).   
The bulk of this empirical EJ literature can be characterized by a continued quest to 
expand the scope of studies, to improve empirical methodologies, and occasionally to dispute the 
validity or relevance of findings.  Most studies advance the field of EJ research by studying a 
new application (e.g., new risks, pollutants, regions, data) or by employing new methods (e.g., 
better exposure models, more robust statistical analyses).  Rarely, and contentiously, an author 
more fundamentally questions the EJ research enterprise.  Chief among the critiques are 
Anderton et al. (1994), Hamilton (1995), Straw (1995), Been and Gupta (1997), and Bowen 
(2000).  These studies distinguish themselves by calling into question basic assumptions in the 
modeling approaches taken in conventional EJ research, suggesting that typical EJ evidence may 
hardly identify the injustice that EJ advocates lament.   
Insofar as academia reflects or supports an environmental justice movement, such 
critiques remain at the fringe of the discourse.  Sometimes, the critics have drawn the ire of other 
EJ researchers (e.g., Ringquist 2005 and Been 1995 critiquing Anderton et al. 1994, Timney 
2002 critiquing Bowen 2000).  Yandle and Burton’s (1996) finding no evidence of racial 
inequities invoked no less than three critiques in this journal.  Yet Helfand and Peyton’s (1999) 
challenge, in the same journal three years later, to conduct more than cross-sectional studies with 
reduced-form models garnered no responses in this journal.1  Most empirical EJ studies still 
adopt cross-sectional approaches without sensitivity to spatial scale problems or temporal 
dynamics.2 
That the EJ literature has not yet answered these critiques and substantially advanced in 
explaining inequities may arise from several influences.  Pellow et al. (2001) imply the absence 
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of explanatory models in the literature results from the limitations of quantitative methods.  
Alternatively, the nature of the EJ research enterprise limits the sorts of questions that are of 
interest (Schweitzer and Stephenson 2007).  In the quest to find environmental inequity for some 
groups, certain comparisons (e.g., overall welfare across groups, preferences across groups) and 
explanations are often deemed secondary.  Moreover, the EJ movement has attracted researchers 
from many disciplines who may be unaware of important existing literatures and methods. 
This mulitidisciplinary research agenda has researchers taking very different approaches 
to questions of justice.  For instance, economists’ analytical frameworks often map awkwardly 
onto the EJ discourse.  While advocates press for more equal distribution of a particular 
environmental harm, economists are given to examining the distribution of welfare and utility 
rather than a select few contributing elements in isolation.  The predominantly static or cross-
sectional analysis of the research generally fails to incorporate a structural model of what might 
give rise to such equilibria.  As such, many claims of environmental injustice might be seen as 
no more than lamenting that the group driving into a store’s parking lot has more disposable 
income than the group driving away.  Much EJ research offers little rigorous evidence to explain 
why distributions are as they are.  In light of these concerns, economists frequently regard the EJ 
literature as a source of more heat than light.  Notably, not all economists stay on the sidelines 
(e.g., Hamilton 1995, Baden and Coursey 2002, Earnhart 2004, Gray and Shadbegian 2004). 
Many in the environmental justice community have also avoided environmental 
economics.  Besides the perception that mainstream economists represent the prevailing power 
structure responsible for present-day inequities, they have many reasons to steer the political 
debate away from economics.  Economists’ insistence on formal modeling often makes the 
research indigestible, especially to policy advocates.   Consumer sovereignty combined with 
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preference heterogeneity makes environmental equity a dubious goal to many economists.  To 
them, it is hardly a human right.  In addition, many economists’ inclination toward efficiency 
makes them accepting of unequal distributions (due to optimal sorting or economies of scale, for 
example), often conditional upon some compensation scheme.  This compensation might be 
nonpecuniary, such as investments in other public or environmental goods.  When an economist 
sees a landfill surrounded by poorer residents, he is as likely to see households shrewdly saving 
on rent as to see households suffering environmental injustice.  Yet broaching the possibility of 
unequal distribution with compensation muddies the simple EJ analysis, which specially 
privileges inequities in the environmental realm.  Section 3 revisits the topic of net impact. 
 
2.  Researchers’ Choices and Robustness of Evidence 
The typical review of the empirical EJ literature summarizes the results of dozens or even 
hundreds of original studies and usually concludes that the evidence (of injustice) is strong 
although some inconsistencies remain.  See Ringquist (2005), Maantay (2002), Bowen and Wells 
(2002), and Brown (1995) for examples of such literature reviews.  In 110 EJ studies reviewed 
here, only 14 reported no significant evidence of injustice, yet 23 of the remaining 96 reported at 
least one model with no evidence of injustice.  Throughout the research process leading up to 
these results, researchers (and editors) make many important choices.    
Most studies use crude proxies for environmental quality or actual exposure.  It is 
common to use the spatial correlation of an aggregate demographic measure (e.g., percent black, 
per-capita income) and the presence of one or more regulated facilities as indicative of 
environmental injustice.  Some studies go further in spatially correlating demographic aggregates 
and some measures of environmental harms coming from within that area.  Except for air quality 
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studies (24 out of 110 sample studies), only the rare and most thorough studies employ measures 
of actual environmental quality or risk exposure.  Very rarely is the dependent variable a “change 
in” or rate or trend.   
Studies draw their samples using different approaches.  Case studies are frequently 
employed, as are samples that range from a local to a national scope.  Within the sample region 
chosen by the researcher, measuring how demographics differ geographically requires observing 
demographics at some scale, such as the individual or household, the Census tract, the county, or 
other scales.  Obviously, for studies using aggregated demographics, the researcher’s choice of 
the appropriate scale and zone over which to aggregate warrants special attention.  In practice, 
data limitations push most researchers to use Census-defined areas.   
An Example: Scale Choice 
To demonstrate the sensitivity of empirical evidence to researchers’ choices, consider 
spatial scale.  Numerous studies have explicitly acknowledged the potential importance of the 
choice of scale (see, e.g., Liu 2000, Bowen 2000, Been and Gupta 1997).  An overview of the 
literature helps put scale issues into perspective.  In contrast to Fotheringham and Wong’s (1991) 
pessimism about identifying predictable effects especially for multivariate analyses, many 
authors in the EJ literature express intuitions and expectations about the effects of spatial 
resolution choice.  Panel A of Table 1 summarizes some of these expectations.  Furthermore, 
several studies have provided some empirical evidence of the effect of resolution choice.  Panel 
B of Table 1 summarizes their findings.  In total, while the conventional wisdom may be that 
effects get stronger as resolution becomes coarser (Panel A), the empirical evidence on the 
matter is quite mixed (Panel B).    
[Table 1 here] 
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Baden et al. (2007) demonstrate the sensitivity of EJ research findings to modeling 
assumptions.  Their analysis follows a conventional approach, predicting the cross-sectional 
distribution of 1,633 sites on the National Priorities List (NPL) of the federal Superfund 
program.  A logit model explains the presence of a high-risk site in a geographic region.  The 
same model is estimated four times, once at each of four scales (i.e., county, zip code, tract, 
block group) commonly used in EJ research.  This same analysis is then repeated separately for 
California and for LA County subsamples.3  Table 2 summarizes their key justice-related results.   
[Table 2 here] 
The results depict an inconsistent story, at best.  On the one hand, small scales may show 
evidence of environmental injustice for blacks depending on the sample.  Income injustice is also 
evident at some resolutions and extents.  On the other hand, evidence of both injustice and 
reverse injustice can be found for income and percent Hispanic, depending on the scale and 
sample.  Even injustice for blacks is not robust across models.  What is the EJ policymaker (e.g., 
court, agency) supposed to do when confronted with these results and lacking guidance on what 
constitutes valid evidence?  The substantive findings themselves cannot provide the answer.  
Mohai and Saha (2006) offer excellent methodological guidance to avoid bias in the construction 
of spatial variables.  Their guidance does not indicate which scale is ultimately appropriate, 
however, only how to construct the measures conditional upon a particular scale.   
Often in the literature, researchers favor the ‘scale appropriate to the impact’ (e.g., Liu 
2000, Ringuist 2005) with little formal justification.  Others seem to favor ‘the smallest available 
scale’ (e.g., Anderton et al. 1994, Maantay 2002), again with little formal justification.  
Tellingly, in Liu’s (2000) book on methods of EJ analysis makes no mention of individuals in 
the chapter on “Defining Units of Analysis.”  The appearance that units of analysis are selected 
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by EJ researchers arbitrarily or conveniently remains (Baden et al. 2007).  More guidance in 
operationally defining basic concepts in empirical testing for evidence of injustice might follow 
assertions by policymakers (e.g., legislatures, agencies, courts).  While the EPA’s Council on 
Environmental Justice (CEQ 1997) shunned giving specific guidance, it did offer some 
principles.  The CEQ instructs that units of analysis should be chosen “so as to not artificially 
dilute or inflate the affected minority population” (p.26), although what this entails in practice – 
where “true” measures are typically lacking – is unclear.     
In the end, these studies typically reveal whether or not some indicator of environmental 
conditions (e.g., presence of a hazwaste site) in an area and some demographic measure (e.g., 
percent black) for that area are correlated among a sample of areas in some region.  With 
potentially many indicators, many areas, and many regions, it is hardly surprising to see such a 
large literature.  Generalizing from even the widest survey of the EJ literature, however, is 
limited by the nature of the research questions asked in these studies.  Rarely do EJ studies 
examine the distribution of environmental amenities (e.g., aesthetics, parks, wilderness).  Rarely 
do they measure environmental quality actually experienced by individuals.  Rarely do they 
incorporate a temporal dimension.  Rarely do they consider geographic areas other than those 
used by the Census (or derived from those Census units).  Rarely do they articulate a formal 
model (with testable hypotheses) to explain the observed data (thus, the inclusion of some 
explanatory variables appears to be arbitrary researcher choices).  And rarely do they measure 
overall welfare or quality of life. 
 
3.  Questioning the Research Questions 
Just States or Just Policies? 
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Ironically perhaps, the EJ literature devotes much energy to identifying environmental 
injustice and surprisingly little effort to defining a just equilibrium.  Several conceptions are 
possible.  The justice of an equilibrium may depend on the outcome meeting specified 
conditions.  It might also or instead depend on the conditions of the process by which the 
outcomes are generated.  If an EJ policy problem exists insofar as just equilibria are not present, 
then the conditions that could give rise to such equilibria become of paramount importance to 
policy design.  Yet relatively little attention is paid to how such a just world could actually be 
constructed – and whether or not such conditions would even be desirable from an individual or 
a societal standpoint.4   
Designing a just policy, rather than a just state of the world, may seem far more 
straightforward and practicable.  Yet it is not without serious and possibly insurmountable 
challenges (Been 1993).  Much of this depends, again, on the precise definition of injustice.  
What are the spatial and temporal dimensions at which injustice can be observed?  Which 
populations are to be treated “fairly,” relative to whom, and controlling for what?     
Defining Impacts: Environmental Harms with no Compensation? 
Consider in more detail one aspect of defining environmental justice: how environmental 
quality is to be measured.  Most EJ research looks at noxious or toxic facilities (or emissions or 
risks from those facilities).  In the 110 studies sampled, 94 fit this description.  These are hardly 
indices of overall environmental quality, and they purposefully avoid measuring a holistic notion 
of quality of life or well-being.5  They also may not capture the full impacts.  The CEQ (1997) 
defines “impacts” to include environmental, social, economic, and other effects, yet most studies 
construe impacts very narrowly.  By restricting the analysis to just part of the environmental 
dimension, the degrees of freedom for policymakers shrink.  For instance, designing 
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compensation schemes into policies cannot overcome environmental injustice if empirical 
measures of injustice are so constructed.     
As a thought experiment, imagine that communities received compensation for 
disamenities.  Here, they would have little incentive to mobilize under the banner of an EJ 
movement seeking to equalize environmental quality.  Relocating their disamenities would 
eliminate the compensation.  The absence of compensation in the first place motivates 
communities to demand policy remedies.  If least-cost host communities also tend to be minority 
or low-income, then the mobilizing communities may find something else in common: their 
disadvantaged status.  Yet just because the hosts tend to be disadvantaged does not imply that 
they host because they are disadvantaged or that they should not host.  Recall that the discontent 
and mobilization was conditional on the lack of compensation, not on disadvantaged status.   
Yet there is something more to EJ than fairness achieved via compensation (Been 1993).  
The appeal to deeper (non-environmental) social justice and human rights concerns marks a 
significant departure in rhetoric and practice from traditional efforts to use legal and political 
processes to obtain remedy for uncompensated harms.6  Disadvantaged communities can tap into 
two sources of support: one for their prevailing social condition, and one for their correlated 
environmental condition.   
Causality and Remedying Injustice 
The modal empirical EJ study tests hypotheses about the equity of cross-sectional 
distribution of environmental conditions across aggregated demographic measures, occasionally 
controlling for some other variables.  The research typically does not ask how these equilibria 
came about, why they came about, or what the implications are in a more holistic sense.  While 
these questions might be secondary to the limited question of distributional equity, they seem 
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important to a judgment of “injustice” (Baden and Coursey 2002) and are crucial to designing 
policy remedies (Helfand and Peyton 1999, Bowen and Wells 2002).  Understanding the forces 
that give rise to the offending equilibrium seems like essential information to designing a policy 
to alter it.  Prejudiced siting practices suggest one policy remedy.  Unequal political activism 
suggests another.  Unequal endowments of income or information suggest others.  White flight 
and exclusionary zoning suggest still others.   
Asking these questions opens the door to a deeper analysis.  Studying the distribution of 
harms is decidedly different than studying the distribution of the impacts of decisions, policies, 
or institutions.  The equity of impacts of some policy (whether an overt policy, like a permitting 
or siting decision, or a more indirect policy, like enabling private land markets) can be assessed 
once an appropriate measure of impact is determined.  While “net impact” might be a useful 
starting point, nearly all EJ studies reject this measure in favor of something else.   
Identifying Counterfactuals 
Given an appropriate notion of impact, measuring it requires a research design capable of 
identifying the effect of the policy.  This analysis requires some knowledge of a counterfactual 
world.  In the absence of that (policy, institution, etc.) which gave rise to the observed 
equilibrium, we would realize the counterfactual.  Depending on the context, the assumptions 
involved in constructing the counterfactual may be quite contentious.  Yet it is difficult to 
imagine how the impacts of a policy are to be assessed without some idea of a counterfactual.  
Inferring that an equilibrium is unequal or unjust cannot escape identifying some point of 
comparison or counterfactual equilibrium.   
In practice, EJ research dwells on this question only briefly if ever.  In much empirical EJ 
research, the counterfactual or comparison is often (1) undisclosed, (2) taken as some uniform or 
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random distribution of environmental quality, or (3) made using the reference group (e.g., white 
neighborhoods).  In the first case, little can be said of the validity of the inference that a policy or 
system is unjust because the alternative world is unknown.  In the second case, any observed 
inequity is prima facie evidence of an unjust policy or system.  Such a counterfactual may be 
more useful as a thought experiment than as a feasible alternative world.7  Yet it may be the most 
common counterfactual employed in EJ research.  The third case presents a more complex 
situation.  The current policy or system gives rise to the observed (in)equity, whereas the 
alternative policy or system would, apparently, give rise to the same impacts for all groups as the 
reference group currently enjoys.  For instance, all black neighborhoods would have as few 
landfills as the white neighborhoods.  Such a counterfactual assumes fewer total landfills.  Thus, 
the comparison involves an alternative distribution of disamenities and an alternative quantity of 
them.  Regardless, the policy or system that gives rise to the counterfactual may be difficult to 
imagine and is generally not specified in EJ analyses. 
Unfortunately, the counterfactual is far more important than most EJ research lets on.  
Studies purporting to show disparate impact often merely identify disproportionate distribution.  
The injustice of the observed level of equity or inequity depends on the alternative world that the 
researcher or advocate imagines.  If the counterfactual was equitable, any observed 
disproportionate distribution would imply an inequitable policy or other change.  If the 
counterfactual was inequitable, however, a policy or other change could improve, worsen, or 
maintain conditions.  Inequitable counterfactual distributions might rightly belong in EJ 
analyses.  In the absence of a policy or decision, harms may not be equitably distributed.  Baden 
and Coursey (2002) offer an intriguing example of discriminatory policies – redlining in Chicago 
during the 1960s – inadvertently protecting certain subpopulations from exposure to hazwaste 
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sites.  The currently observed equity belies the discriminatory policy and possibly inequitable 
counterfactual.  Even as observed equity may be evidence of an unjust policy, observed inequity 
may be evidence of just policies.  Much hinges on the specified counterfactual. 
Back to the Nature of EJ 
Yet surprisingly little effort has gone towards answering those questions (why is the 
equilibrium as it is? how is this more or less just than some counterfactual?).  Certainly one 
reason for this is that such research is far more difficult than static equity studies.  Perhaps 
another major reason for this disinterest can be traced back to the nature of the EJ movement. 
Environmental justice is steeped in notions of social equity, of value judgments, and of a 
social policy that ostensibly favors the vulnerable and the disadvantaged.  The environmental 
justice discourse is difficult to disentangle from a political agenda.  Even if ambiguous, the 
premise for and conduct of the research is grounded in a political discourse (Williams 1999, 
Kurtz 2003).  Showing conditions to be inequitable gives political ammunition to EJ advocates.  
How they are able to use that evidence, however, depends on the situation and prevailing 
policies.  See Bowen (2000) for a discussion of advocates’ use of scholarly research.   
Scientific certainty and an understanding of causal mechanisms is often a secondary 
consideration, at most, in a policy setting.  Causal evidence can be unnecessary or even 
undesirable in a political context.  Such information might undermine the legitimacy of the EJ 
movement’s policy aims.8  For example, suppose that the inequity was shown to arise from lack 
of collective action on the part of minority communities (see, e.g., Hamilton 1995) rather than 
unequal endowments of wealth.  Advocates seeking financial compensation rather than 
additional political empowerment might view the additional research findings less than 
favorably.  In addition, findings that suggest that the inequity arose due to minorities 
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disproportionately seeking out hazardous sites may weaken the advocate’s position.  
Accordingly, the limitations of the body of EJ research can be at least partially linked to its 
limited use in the political arena. 
 
4.  Some Lessons from the Empirical Literature 
It has been argued that the politics of EJ limit the useful or relevant empirical research, 
placing considerable emphasis on studies of cross-sectional distribution of environmental 
disamenities.  Such research is sufficient evidence to support EJ advocacy.  Relatively little 
interest has been paid to actually evaluating the equity of impacts of environmental policies.  The 
net impacts of these policies or systems – where the observed outcomes of a policy are compared 
to the outcomes under some counterfactual scenario – are virtually unknown to the EJ literature.   
With this rather bleak diagnosis of the literature, what can be said of its implications for 
design of EJ policy?  First, and most pragmatically, it should be noted that clear definitions of 
justice and injustice are crucial.  The conditions that must be satisfied for something to be judged 
“just” or “unjust” should be thought out well in advance and clearly operationalized for empirical 
observations.  An explicit statement on valid methods of data analysis may also be warranted.  
Although it appears cumbersome from a policymaking standpoint, sufficient guidance must be 
present in the EJ policy to direct an empirical researcher seeking to observe something so 
essential as the mere existence of the problem.  How can this be done?  Are case studies valid 
evidence, or does the policy refer only to broad patterns in society rather than idiosyncratic 
injustice?  Is inequity observable using aggregate data (e.g., Census tracts), or must it hinge on 
observations of individuals?  What methods of spatial aggregation are valid for drawing 
inferences about the existence of injustice?  What are valid control variables? 
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Perhaps it is unfortunate, but EJ policy that offers no guidance on these sorts of questions 
will do little to improve current policy.  Today’s ambiguity and acrimony will likely persist.  
And, like many other areas of environmental policy (e.g., air quality, multiple-use of public 
lands), the ambiguity may enable the implementers of the policy to achieve a working definition 
that adequately mollifies all parties so as to forestall reform by the legislature.   
Recall the demonstration in Table 2.  It seems that Table 2 has evidence to support any 
advocate’s position, regardless of what that position is!  EJ supporters may like small scales for 
their analysis, while their opponents might prefer large units for their’s.  Obviously, the evidence 
can be insufficient to resolve the debate.  For EJ research to have significance or consistency 
beyond ad hoc declarations of what constitutes valid evidence, some clearly articulated 
principles need to be advanced to guide decision-makers facing real-world complexities and 
evidence. 
Empirical evidence on Superfund and its distributional issues typifies the complexities in 
drawing inferences about environmental injustices and in designing policy remedies.  For 
simplicity, assume for now that Census block groups are the appropriate unit of analysis.  
Closely replicating the Baden et al. (2007) analysis appearing in Table 2, Table 3 shows how 
evidence of distributional equity varies depending on the “control group.”  In other words, what 
may seem just by one counterfactual seems unjust by another when those control variables are 
not distributed independently.  That control variables help define the counterfactual and thus the 
meaning of “injustice” can make the researcher’s choice pivotal.   
Empirical evidence on Superfund and its distributional issues typifies the complexities in 
drawing inferences about environmental injustices and in designing policy remedies.  Baden et 
al. (2007) remind us of how critical spatial scale and scope are.  Yet assessing distributional 
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equity hinges on how “justice” is defined in other dimensions as well.  Table 3 extends the 
previous analysis of Superfund site distribution to demonstrate how these definitional choices are 
both pivotal and contentious.9  The first five models show how different control variables greatly 
alter the apparent inequity in distribution of NPL sites.  The second four models show how 
different definitions of which units are impacted also seriously affect the evidence of inequity.  
The last two models, discussed later, modify the definition of impact again. 
Changing the control variables entails more than just changing the significance and sign 
of the results.  It implies different concepts of injustice and different criteria for evidence.  Model 
1 shows that block groups with greater shares of white residents and with lower incomes are 
more likely to host an NPL site.  Yet, once population density, population, and presence in an 
MSA are controlled for, this evidence of inequity partly reverses itself.  Model 2 shows NPL 
sites to be more common in minority and wealthy areas (although income effects are 
insignificant).  Similar results are found in Model 4, which adds in MSA-level fixed effects.  
Model 3, close to the Baden et al. (2007) specification, adds controls for state-level fixed effects.  
And, finally in Model 5, with both MSA- and state-level controls, the results show NPL sites 
tend to be found in poor, minority areas.  Which specification is appropriate depends on the 
definition of justice.  The first model clearly indicates that areas with greater shares of white 
residents, not minorities, are more likely to host NPL sites.  The disproportionate exposure to 
NPL sites for minorities depends on controlling for population density.  Arguably, whites are 
disproportionately exposed to NPL sites, although at any given population density they appear 
under-exposed to NPL sites.  Likewise, the strength of the correlation between income and NPL 
sites depends on the control variables.   
Conceptually, whether inequity is unconditional or conditional has great consequence for 
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research design and for policy design.  Perhaps any inequity – unconditional and conditional – is 
unjust and worthy of remedy.  Most EJ evidence arises from reduced-form models (Helfand and 
Peyton 1999), often with little justification for why the evidence of injustice ought to be 
conditional.  Given the complexity of the distributions and the enormous array of possible 
controls, researchers might not need to look far to find a significant correlation between race or 
income and exposure conditional on something.  The percent white of areas within 1 mile of 
NPL sites, based on the areal concentration method described by Mohai and Saha (2006), was 
61.2%, compared to the national average of 70.1% for block groups in 2000.  (Median household 
incomes near sites are virtually identical to national averages.)  Yet Table 3 shows how the 
apparent disproportionate exposure can change radically depending on the controls.   
The conditionality of inequity is no less salient to designing a policy to tackle inequitable 
exposure to NPL sites.  Suppose that a just Superfund policy ensures that exposure to NPL sites 
was somehow proportionate to race.  To achieve the policy aim, given existing distributions of 
eligible sites and populations, a policymaker would need to carefully select sites for the NPL.  
Random selection might fail if eligible sites were not distributed independently from race.  
Alternatively, a policy that aims for proportionate exposure conditional upon something (e.g., 
preexisting eligible sites, the state or the MSA in question) targets a very different objective.  
Meeting the conditional objective may not satisfy the unconditional objective, and vice versa.   
Evidence of injustice is also highly sensitive to the definition of which units are affected 
by the disamenity.  The NPL results in Table 3 demonstrate this.  The model replicating the 
strongest evidence of injustice from Baden et al. (2007), Model 3, gives inconsistent results 
when the choice of impacted units changes.  When hosts are block groups with NPL sites (Model 
3) or are block groups whose centers are within one mile of NPL sites (Model 6), conditions look 
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worse for nonwhites and the poor.  The same holds when hosts are defined as block groups with 
most of their area contained in a one-mile radius of the site (Model 8).  Yet expanding the radius 
to six miles, the upper limit of NPL sites’ observed impacts on property values (Noonan et al. 
2007), makes the income effect vanish (Model 9) or even reverse signs (Model 7).  Some caution 
is advised in drawing strong conclusions given the complexity of the circumstances, possibility 
of data mining, and absence of clear a priori guidelines for policy relevant evidence. 
[Insert Table 3 here.] 
Secondly, clarity is needed on the sorts of impacts that are relevant for the determination 
of injustice.  This invites questions about causation and chronology, about racist intent or 
incidental byproducts of other processes.  Researchers frequently invoke EJ concerns when 
environmental conditions are distributed unequally, whatever the cause.  The bulk of the EJ 
literature offers evidence on the inequity of conditions.  It is relatively silent on evidence of 
inequitable impacts of decisions, policies, institutions, etc.  Some see EJ policy as equalizing 
conditions, regardless of their cause.  To others, EJ policy aims to prevent or correct 
discriminatory impacts of decisions or processes.  Unambiguous EJ policy might clarify the role 
of “impact” and help researchers and advocates separate evidence of inequitable states from 
evidence of inequitable policies.   
To continue the NPL example, consider a model of EPA’s decisions to delete certain sites 
from the NPL during the 1990s.  Like before, logit models can explain the deletions using 
demographics (circa 1990) and state- and MSA-specific fixed effects.  Following Mohai and 
Saha’s (2006) suggestion, host block groups are those with over half of their area within a 1- or 
6-mile radius of a NPL.  Some block groups that hosted in 1990 enjoyed deletions during the 
1990s (8.1% for the 1-mile buffer).  The results in Table 3 show that among hosts of NPL sites, 
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those neighborhoods that were poorer and more minority in 1990 were more likely to have their 
site deleted from NPL – the final stage in Superfund clean-up.  The results for race are 
significant for a 6-mile radius (Model 11) but not for 1 mile (Model 10).  There may be many 
reasons for this disproportionate impact on poor and minority areas, such as nonrandom 
distribution of initial site quality, remediation efforts, or clean-up standards.  Such an 
investigation is beyond the scope of the present paper.  Instead, it suffices to emphasize here that 
injustice in conditions (Models 8 – 9) may not be represented in changes (Models 10 – 11).  By 
shifting the focus from the distribution of hazardous sites to the distribution of their clean-ups 
under the Superfund program, a clearer link between the policy implementation and its impacts 
is drawn.  Starting in 1990 with an inventory of sites on the NPL and a distribution of the 
population, the EPA managed to delete Superfund sites that tended to be in the more 
disadvantaged areas.  The cross-sectional models cannot resolve the identification problem, 
where subpopulations may attract sites just as they are attracted to sites.  The deletion models, 
however, overcome this by using 1990 demographics, which are not affected by subsequent 
clean-ups.  While hardly definitive evidence of discrimination in implementation of the policy, 
these results offer a much stronger connection between policy choices and affected populations 
than the other models in Table 3, typical of the EJ literature, which show only how listed sites 
and populations collocate.   
A third implication of the empirical EJ literature for policy design is that a critical 
distinction can be made between equitable outcomes and equitable processes.  This time-worn 
distinction in equity discussions remains central to the politics of EJ and the nature of empirical 
research.  The relevant data tend to describe outcomes, and federal policies to produce more 
information (arising partly in response to the EJ movement) tend to make information available 
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on outcomes rather than processes.  In future policies (environmental and otherwise), 
policymakers would do well to explicitly consider both notions of environmental justice.   
Fourth, policy should articulate the relevance of net impacts of policies and whether 
environmental impacts can be considered piecemeal or must be holistic.  The question of 
whether compensatory gains in other dimensions are relevant in assessing environmental 
inequities is directly relevant to designing policies to remedy environmental insults.  Even if EJ 
researchers have paid inconsistent or minimal attention to this matter, other changes that coincide 
with environmental impacts are of pragmatic interest to residents, courts, policymakers, and 
others.  These gains (or losses!) can take many forms.  They might be environmental (ample 
greenery in exchange for high volatile organic compound emissions) or nonenvironmental (more 
jobs in exchange for industrial sitings), private (lower rent for more disamenities) or public 
(funding for public schools in exchange for a permit to operate a landfill).  EJ policy design 
could specify the extent to which net impacts matter or which compensations are relevant.  
Insofar as such decisions and “bounding” of the EJ problem are contentious, it becomes all the 
more important for such decisions to be made in a transparent and democratic forum rather than 
by technocrats or academics. 
For hazardous sites, their siting and their remediation are often expected to affect local 
quality of life as well as property values.  Risks posed by Superfund sites are often associated 
with discounted housing.  Conversely, after cleaning up the site, rents are often expected to rise 
to bring the housing market into equilibrium.  Gentrification and pricing out poor residents is 
often a concern with brownfield remediation.  The national sample of NPL sites offers some 
evidence of this.  Block groups with NPL sites in 1990 had lower property values than those 
without, although low land pries can be a cause or an effect of siting.  Using the areal 
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apportionment method, median housing values within one mile of NPL sites that were deleted 
during the 1990s appreciated by 40.1% during that timespan.  This exceeds the comparable rate 
within one mile of all NPL sites circa 1990 (31.2%) and the population-weighted national 
average for block groups (34.2%).  While the evidence elsewhere is mixed on whether residents 
nearby NPL sites enjoy discounts (Noonan et al. 2007), impacts on local prices can have 
important justice implications.  If price effects of exposure to these harms are insignificant, then 
it suggests that local quality of life might not be noticeably affected.  Conversely, if the price 
effects are significant, then perhaps those effects are a relevant part of the impacts. 
Finally, recent research suggests that there may be good reason to be concerned about the 
effects of changes in environmental quality on migration.  Remediating Superfund sites tends to 
have pronounced effects on the demographic composition of nearby neighborhoods and on 
property prices (Noonan et al. 2007, Cameron and McConnaha 2006).  Changes in air quality 
should also affect migration, even within the same airshed, in ways highly correlated with 
income (Banzhaf and Walsh 2006, Sieg et al. 2004).  The dynamic systems that produce the 
distributions of people and environment that we see are complex indeed.  Careful modeling of 
these systems may reveal unexpected or unanticipated implications for equity.  For instance, 
remediating brownfields in ghettos may appear to bring aid to disadvantaged communities, but 
might induce gentrification where incoming groups enjoy the bulk of the remediation’s benefits.  
Design of an implementable EJ policy based on direct evidence of injustice should consider these 
general equilibrium issues. 
 
5.  A Bold Recommendation 
An alternative approach to EJ policy is to abandon it.  Such a recommendation is not to 
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suggest that social equity and environmental equity are not both laudable goals.  Rather, the 
recommendation is based on the idea that equity (or, at least, distributional implications) is 
typically central to concerns of policymakers that branding it “environmental justice” and taking 
it outside of the core of all policy considerations seems inconsistent and distracting to good 
policy.  Agyeman and Evans (2004) argue for the inseparability of EJ and sustainability, while 
Keohane et al. (1998) explain the inextricable link between distributional effects and efficiency 
of environmental regulation.  Equity is already central to most policy decisions along with other 
concerns.10   
Nonetheless, environmental equity garners much special attention.  At least three 
nonexclusive explanations for this special attention come to mind:  
a. Inadequate institutions exist for compensating individuals or communities for 
environmental harms. 
b. Spatial clustering by demographics (especially income) tends to correlate with 
environmental quality. 
c. Redistributive politics has moved to a new frontier, moving beyond traditional 
policies that merely promote social equality to promoting environmental equity. 
The first two concerns involve defining and measuring impacts and various spatial processes, 
already discussed at length.  The third point casts EJ as another forum for using state power to 
redistribute resources.  More specifically, it views EJ advocates as using politics to redistribute 
resources couched now in environmental rhetoric (and via environmental policies).  Unlike 
traditional income redistribution policies, however, EJ policies crafted to promote environmental 
equity may be greatly complicated by the heterogeneity of tastes for environmental goods (unlike 
income) and perhaps the relative ease with which individuals can switch their environments. 
 22 
These different issues all suggest different directions for EJ policy.  To some observers at 
least, the injustice of (a) seems more clear than in (b).  The injustice in (c) is quite contested.  A 
new formulation of environmental justice might start with these three points to craft a policy 
framework.   
• The first principle would be to improve institutions so that individuals or 
communities are compensated for enduring environmental harms.11  This means 
improving land markets, improving property rights and enforcing environmental tort 
claims, improving political institutions that allocate environmental harms so that 
hosts receive appropriate compensation.   
• The second principle would be to promote additional research into the systems and 
forces that dictate the location of individuals and communities and environmental 
amenities.  Agencies and policymakers should be directed to prospectively investigate 
the equity of the effects of their policies (and possibly the equity of their processes). 
• The third principle would be to either make explicit the transfer of resources from one 
group to another (taking place via an environmental policy) or simply avoid it as a 
matter of environmental policy by leaving redistribution to the broader realm of social 
policy.  This approach borrows from first principles of economics, which might see 
the rent-seeking among EJ advocates as transaction costs and social waste.  Ideally, 
design the policy to simply transfer the wealth according to some social choice 
mechanism.  The notion of “environmental justice communities” may already track 
along this line.  Or, given the other priorities and specialties of environmental 
agencies and policymakers, perhaps redistributive policies should be consolidated 
into another policy area. 
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Table 1:  Effects of Scale, Identified from Intuition, Theory, or Empirical Analysis 
Panel A: Identified from Intuition or Theory 
Author Effect as Scale 
Increases 
Comment 
Fotheringham & Wong (1991) Correlations ↑ Bivariate only, with stable 
covariance 
Fotheringham & Wong (1991) ? (uncertain) Multivariate 
Cutter et al. (1996) Correlations ↑  
Hockman and Morris (1998) Correlations ↑  
Sui (1999) Correlations ↓ Due to scale effects 
Sui (1999) ? (uncertain) Due to zoning effects 
Maantay (2002) Reliability ↓  
Maantay (2002) Accuracy ↓  
Dolinoy and Miranda (2004) Exposures ↑  
Ringquist (2005) Correlations ↑ Aggregation bias 
 
Panel B: Identified from Empirical Analysis 
Author Effect as Scale Increases Comment 
Ringquist (2005) Mixed for race, no effect for 
income, effects ↓ for poverty 
Meta-analysis of EJ studies 
Anderton et al. (1994) Correlations ↑ Multi-scale study (only tract 
vs. tract-plus-adjacent-tracts) 
Glickman (1994) Race correlations ↑, income Multi-scale study 
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 correlations ↓ 
Cutter et al. (1996) Correlations ↑ Multi-scale study 
Sui (1999) Race correlations ↑, income 
correlations ↓ 
Multi-scale study  
Sheppard et al. (1999) 
 
Income correlations ↑ Multi-scale study 
Taquino et al. (2002) Income correlations ↑, no 
effect for race 
Multi-scale study 
Dolinoy and Miranda 
(2004) 
Mixed for income, race 
correlations ↓ 
Multi-scale study 
Glickman (2004) 
 
Race correlations ↑, income 
correlations ↑ 
Multi-scale study 
Baden et al. (2007) Mixed; generally race and 
income correlations ↓  
Multi-scale, multi-scope 
study 
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Table 2:  Summary EJ Results from Logit Analyses of NPL Siting 
  Unit of Analysis 
 variable County Zip Code Tract Block Group 
Nation 
% Black +* +*** +*** +*** 
% Hispanic –* +*** +*** +*** 
Income + – –*** –*** 
State 
(California) 
% Black + + +*** +*** 
% Hispanic – + +*** +*** 
Income – – – – 
Local 
(LA County) 
% Black n/a – – – 
% Hispanic n/a + +* +*** 
Income n/a – –** –** 
Dependent variable: an NPL site located in the area. 
+ positive relationship;  – negative relationship 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: Baden et al., 2007. 
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Table 3:  Summary Results for Logit Regressions for NPL sites 
  % White Income   
model dependent variable coeff. coeff. controls included N 
1. in BG 0.8934*** -0.0022*  205633 
2. in BG -0.6280*** 0.0016 density, population, MSAdum  205625 
3. in BG  -1.1691*** -0.0079*** density, population, 
MSAdum, State FE 
205625 
4. in BG  -0.8129*** 0.0005 density, population, MSA FE 187705 
5. in BG  -1.1132*** -0.0093*** density, population, State FE, 
MSA FE 
187705 
6. BG within 1 mi. -0.6600*** -0.0072*** density, population, 
MSAdum, State FE 
204582 
7. BG within 6 mi. -1.3695*** 0.0039*** density, population, 
MSAdum, State FE 
205625 
8. 50% of BG area within 
1 mi.  
-0.6650*** -0.0079*** density, population, 
MSAdum, State FE 
204582 
9. 50% of BG area within 
6 mi.  
-1.0865*** -0.0000 density, population, 
MSAdum, State FE 
205625 
10. 50% of BG area within 
1 mi. of deletion 
-0.3787 -0.0125*** density in 1990, population in 
1990, MSAdum, State FE 
1902 
11. 50% of BG area within 
6 mi. of deletion 
-0.4565*** -0.0169*** density in 1990, population in 
1990, MSAdum, State FE 
31371 
*, **, *** indicate p>.1, p>.05, p>.01 levels, respectively. 
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Notes: 
1  No articles in Social Sciences Quarterly have cited Helfand and Peyton (1999).  Of 16 
subsequent empirical EJ papers in this journal, all estimate reduced-form equations that Helfand 
and Peyton argue cannot demonstrate causality in complex systems.  The inability to make 
causal claims is only explicit in several of these papers. 
2  A sample of 110 quantitative EJ, including many of the most-cited studies according to the ISI 
Web of Science Social Science Index, was taken from Baden et al. (1997).  Of their 110 studies, 
only 19 presented results at multiple scales, another 18 presented dynamic analyses, and just one 
did both.   
3  The logit model uses as control variables: a dummy for whether the observation is in an MSA; 
the observation’s population, population density, and percent urban population; and the 
observations’ percent employed in manufacturing and percent unemployment.  All demographic 
data are from the 2000 Census. 
4  A world of no environmental risk is even more difficult to imagine, given the underlying (and 
ecologically desirable) natural variation in environmental risk.  The case of equal risk 
distribution would seem achievable by a randomized collocation of individuals and risks, but 
even then there would need to be austere restrictions on relocation of either.  Ringquist’s (2006) 
conclusion also touches on some of these issues for anthropogenic risk sources. 
5  Most studies use as a dependent variable some measure of an environmental disamenity, x, an 
element in the vector of other environmental disamenities and amenities, X.  Individuals enjoy 
the multiple aspects of their environmental quality along with a vector of other local public 
goods, Z.  They also possess some income Y.  We might define an indirect utility function for 
the individual as V = f(X, Y, Z).  Comparisons of x across individuals, or between the observed 
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and counterfactual scenarios, may be poor indicators of variations in well-being when numerous 
processes exist in which individuals can directly or indirectly trade off X, Y, or Z for x.  Yet, in a 
sense, it is this restriction to x (or X) that distinguishes EJ from broader “social justice” issues. 
6  Another way to mobilize the EJ movement, it has been suggested, is around the concept of 
“environmental justice communities.”  While definitions may vary, one approach focuses efforts 
to support or empower these environmental justice communities because they are “at risk” of 
disproportionate impact – even if their impact is not in fact disproportionate.  The EJ 
communities are typically identified as minority, low-income, or disadvantaged in some other 
way.  This construction of EJ shifts the focus from inequitable environmental impacts to 
inequitable power or resource distribution.  The policy response is to confer special benefits or 
treatment to EJ communities, not necessarily as compensation for environmental harms, but as a 
way to “level the playing field” more generally. 
7  Depending on how the impact is measured, achieving the counterfactual of perfect equality 
seems both hugely impractical and highly inefficient.  A policy or system that actually induced 
uniform environmental quality would wreak havoc on underlying natural variations.  It would 
also ignore economies and diseconomies of scale and place, heterogeneous preferences, and 
other diverse sorting.  The policy or system that could actually yield such a just distribution of 
environmental quality would be interesting to see elaborated and justified, but this has not yet 
been done to my knowledge.  Schweitzer and Stephenson (2007) also identify this shortcoming 
in the context of environmental equity and urban sustainability theorists. 
8  Of course, more information can also enhance claims of injustice, such as when the observed 
distribution appears equitable but is actually the result of unjust or racist policies or systems.     
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9 Table 3 contains logit regression results based on block-group level data from the 2000 Census.  
Income is median household income (in $1000s), density is population density, and the 
“MSAdum” is merely an indicator of whether the unit was in an MSA in 2000.  “MSA FE” and 
“State FE” refer to vectors of dummy variables for each MSA and state, respectively.  The N 
includes all units with complete information, although specific models will drop observations 
when there is no variance within a particular group (e.g., no NPL sites in a particular MSA). 
10  EJ advocates are likely to disagree.  Yet it is my contention that equity (procedural fairness 
and distributional considerations) plays important, even dominant, roles in the making of 
environmental policies in the U.S..  It is not my contention that the resulting policies, their 
implementations, or outcomes generally are equitable.  Obviously, giving equity a role in 
policymaking is not a sufficient condition for the resulting policies or outcomes to be equitable.  
Nonetheless, ample theory and evidence have been offered to support the prominent role of 
equity and distributional considerations in policymaking generally, in regulatory behavior, and in 
environmental policy.  A review of this literature is beyond the scope of this paper, but readers 
are referred to start at Gray and Shadbegian (2004), Earnhart (2004), and more generally 
Keohane et al. (1998).  
11  Ideally, they would also pay for enjoying environmental amenities. 
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